Case In Point

Superior Court Upholds Federal Termination Clause Under Baker

Case In Point

Superior Court Upholds Federal Termination Clause Under Baker

Date: November 17, 2026

A few months ago, we wrote about the Court of Appeal for Ontario’s important decision in Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc. in which, writing for the Court, Justice Monahan detailed the framework for the interpretation of termination provisions in employment contracts. Justice Monahan held that the correct approach is to read the contract as a whole in the context of the relevant surrounding circumstances, and consider whether the termination provision reflects the parties’ objective intention to comply with the applicable legislation’s minimum standards upon the termination of employment. The interpretive approach from Baker cautions courts to avoid adopting a legalistic, “magic words” reading of isolated words or straining to manufacture ambiguity where the parties objective intentions are otherwise clear.

In Henshell v. Batchewana First Nation of Ojibways, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice used the Baker interpretive framework to uphold a termination clause for a federally regulated employee. The Court found that a for cause reference elsewhere in the agreement did not make the termination clause unenforceable, and struck the employee’s claims for moral, punitive and repudiation damages.

Why Henshell Matters to Employers

Henschell signals that Ontario courts are willing to interpret termination clauses on a holistic reading in accordance with the Baker framework. Because the vulnerability of for cause language will depend on how the termination clause was drafted, employers are encouraged to track the statutory standard exactly and avoid broad for cause language that departs from it.

Background

The Plaintiff, a lawyer with 20 years’ experience, left her practice to become Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Batchewana First Nation of Ojibways (BFN). BFN terminated her employment without cause on July 23, 2024, less than three months after she started.

The CEO claimed $350,000.00 (24 months’ pay in lieu of common law notice), plus $500,000.00 in moral and punitive damages, due to the manner of her dismissal. She alleged that her dismissal was in retaliation for raising concerns about possible financial misappropriation under two legal services retainers, and that the motion to dismiss her was made by the mother of one of the lawyers involved.

The employment agreement allowed BFN to terminate “for any lawful reason” on providing notice or pay in lieu, severance and other entitlements required by the applicable legislation, the Canada Labour Code (Code), with no further common law notice. A separate clause in the employment agreement’s Rules and Regulations provision stated that any breach of the employer’s confidentiality policies or procedures “will be cause for severe discipline and/or termination of employment for cause”. The CEO argued that the termination provision was unenforceable because that confidentiality language allowed her employment to be terminated without her Code entitlements for any breach of the confidentiality provisions.

BFN brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the termination clause was enforceable, and under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the claim.

Decision

The Termination Clause Was Enforceable

The Court accepted that the CEO’s reading of the confidentiality language “may be a plausible interpretation if the impugned words were read literally and in isolation”. However, the Court adopted the Baker framework, which required the contractual provisions to be read “in context with a view to identifying what the parties objectively intended based on the text and surrounding circumstances”. This approach led the Court to hold that, for the following reasons, the termination clause was enforceable, and the CEO was not entitled to common law notice:

  • The word or meant that not all breaches of confidentiality would lead to termination for cause
  • The termination provision clearly showed an intention on BFN’s part to comply fully with the Code and provide the CEO with all entitlements under the statute on termination for any lawful reason, and the two provisions “are properly read together”
  • An experienced lawyer would not have understood the language to take away her Code rights, particularly when she was leaving her law practice to accept the position
  • The decisions cited by the CEO in support of her argument involved broader wording and they did not decide the issue under the Baker interpretive framework

The Claim for Moral and Punitive Damages Was Denied

The Court found that there was no tenable claim for moral or punitive damages because no independent actionable wrong was pleaded. The Court confirmed that moral damages for the manner of dismissal can still be claimed when a termination clause is enforceable, because they are compensatory for mental distress caused by an employer’s conduct during the termination process, and do not extend the notice period. Even so, the court held that the facts pleaded (i.e., that the CEO was induced to leave her job, unceremoniously terminated, terminated in retaliation, not given a second opportunity to bring her concerns to Council, and the decision to terminate her represented a conflict of interest) did not disclose bad faith in the manner of dismissal. The Court found that the pleading relied on the reason for termination and noted that there is no requirement for good faith reasons for dismissal; the conduct that must be established for an award for moral damages relates instead to the manner of dismissal.

In response to the CEO’s alternative claim that her dismissal in retaliation constituted a repudiation of the employment contract, the Court found that BFN was not seeking to abandon the agreement, but was rather seeking to enforce it. BFN’s alleged conduct fell well short of the egregious, toxic, and bad faith actions required to repudiate an employment contract.

Key Takeaways

The Baker Interpretive Framework Helps Employers

This first post-Baker decision indicates that courts are moving away from finding that termination clauses are void over a literal reading of words in isolation. Instead, they are reading employment contracts as a whole in the context of the relevant surrounding circumstances, and considering whether a termination provision reflects the parties’ objective intention to comply with the applicable legislation’s minimum standards upon the termination of employment. Courts are taking this approach whether the applicable legislation is the Code or the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

Drafting Skills Matter

The termination clause in Henshell survived partly because the confidentiality language was qualified (and/or) and expressly referred to providing all statutory entitlements on termination “for any lawful reason”. When drafting a termination clause, employers should track the statutory standard exactly and avoid broad for cause language that departs from it.

An Enforceable Termination Clause does not Rule Out Moral Damages

Claims for moral damages based on the manner of dismissal stand on their own. They can still be claimed when a termination clause is enforceable, because they are compensatory for mental distress caused by an employer’s conduct during the termination process, and do not extend the notice period. To avoid liability for moral damages, employers should ensure that employee dismissals are conducted in a manner that is not untruthful, misleading or unduly insensitive.

For advice on how this decision may affect your employment contracts, please contact your Hicks Morley lawyer.


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